Intercooperation, flexicurity and their impacton workers: The case of Fagor Electrodomésticos by Santos-Larrazabal, Josu & Basterretxea, Imanol
1 
 
Intercooperation, flexicurity and their 
impact on workers: the case of Fagor 
Electrodomésticos 
JOSU SANTOS-LARRAZABAL and IMANOL BASTERRETXEA 
University of the Basque Country, UPV/EHU, Spain 
 
This is an electronic version of the accepted paper in the journal Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics. 
 
It is open access under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 
License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes. 
© 2021 The Authors. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics published by John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Edgard Milhaud Foundation. 
 
Please, cite this article as: 
Santos-Larrazabal, J. & Basterretxea, I. Intercooperation, flexicurity and their impact on 
workers: The case of Fagor Electrodomésticos. Ann Public Coop Econ. 2021;1–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12329 
 






Mondragon cooperatives have used flexible employment, training and labour protection 
policies to deal with economic crises since the 1970s. These policies were also used in 
2013 to alleviate the social consequences of the demise of their biggest industrial 
cooperative, Fagor Electrodomésticos. This article aims to analyse – through 40 
interviews with different stakeholders – the advantages and limitations of wage, working 
time and functional flexibility policies by framing them under the flexicurity concept. In 
contrast with previous research on Mondragon cooperatives, this study has found a 
strong worker-owner resistance to flexicurity policies, mainly before the firm’s bankruptcy. 
The study has also found the main reasons for worker resistance and for some successful 
Mondragon cooperatives’ reluctance to offer permanent relocations to redundant Fagor 
Electrodomésticos’ members. This research will help cooperatives to maintain and 
improve their flexicurity policies and their resilience. Some findings can be extrapolated 
to the growing number of firms that aim to implement flexicurity policies without harming 
their workers’ social welfare. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The bankruptcy of Fagor Electrodomésticos (FED) in 2013 and the responses that 
Mondragon Corporation has given to its redundant worker-members have been a critical 
test of stress and validity of flexicurity policies. These policies are based on the trade-off 
between employment security for its members and several forms of labour flexibility 
(Wilthagen & Tros, 2004). Mondragon’s worker-owners have traditionally voted to 
reduce their own wages, have approved the adjustment of their working hours or 
schedules to meet their firms’ needs, and have shown high levels of functional flexibility 
(e.g., Logan, 1988; Cheney, 1999; Bakaikoa et al., 2004). Functional flexibility in 
Mondragon cooperatives implies not only transferring employees to different activities 
and tasks within each firm but also relocating worker-owners of cooperatives in crisis to 
those in need of a workforce (Basterretxea & Albizu, 2010). 
The literature tends to represent these flexicurity policies as a source of competitive 
advantage and an element that has allowed Mondragon’s cooperatives to adapt to market 
fluctuations and manage crises relatively successfully (Bradley & Gelb, 1987; Logan, 
1988; Whyte & Whyte, 1988; Albizu & Basterretxea, 1998; Ormaechea, 1998; Smith, 
2001; Clamp, 2003; Basterretxea & Albizu, 2010; Elortza et al., 2012; Landeta et al., 
2016; Errasti et al., 2017; Arando & Arenaza, 2018). Although these studies have 
enrichingly and faithfully analysed the Mondragon policies, they do not seem to have 
delved into the negative effects of wage reduction, working time flexibility and functional 
flexibility on worker-owners’ wellbeing and satisfaction. Excluding a few which have 
referred to Mondragon worker-owners’ refusal to relocate to cooperatives far from their 
homes in the 1980s (e.g., Cheney, 1999; Clamp, 2003), previous studies have neither 
analysed any possible worker-owner resistance to those measures nor the possible 
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resistance of successful cooperatives to help and relocate worker-owners of unsuccessful 
ones. An often-idyllic situation has conversely been presented, in which cooperatives ‘can 
relocate [their] members rapidly and with a low level of friction among different activities 
and tasks’ (Albizu & Basterretxea, 1998). 
Previous research on flexicurity measures in Mondragon has mainly considered 
managers’ opinions, overlooking important distortions, such as their social desirability 
bias (Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014). Many previous researchers have also presumed that 
there is an equivalence between Mondragon Corporation’s formal flexicurity policy and 
its day‐to‐ day internalisation in its cooperatives. While Mondragon defines and fosters 
flexicurity policies, the corporation has insufficient power to impose them on its 98 
cooperatives. The way these policies are thus implemented in each cooperative differs 
significantly, usually after lengthy negotiations between the corporation and its 
cooperatives. This decoupling of practices from formally adopted policies, which has 
been broadly analysed from a neo-institutionalist perspective in Heras-Saizarbitoria’s 
(2014) research, can also occur because of worker resistance. The present research will 
add light to conflicts cooperatives face when applying flexicurity policies, their causes 
and manifestations. 
Recent research points to wage reductions and relocations as factors that could partially 
explain poor responses in satisfaction surveys and increasing levels of absenteeism in 
some big Mondragon cooperatives (Basterretxea & Storey, 2018; Basterretxea et al., 
2019), thus a nuanced analysis of Mondragon flexicurity strategy is required. 
The adoption of flexicurity policies as a strategy by the European Union and the increase 
in studies addressing it (Bender & Theodossiou, 2018; Bredgaard & Madsen, 2018; 
Bekker & Mailand, 2019) reflect the fact that these policies are becoming more common 
in a greater number of companies. Some studies also stress that how flexicurity policies 
are implemented in certain countries, particularly in Southern Europe, leads to increased 
labour market precariousness (Domínguez, 2012; Fernández-Rodríguez et al., 2012; 
Gialis et al., 2014; Gialis & Taylor, 2016). This study aims to benefit the companies 
interested in implementing flexicurity, whether they are cooperatives or not, so that its 
implementation is cost-effective and has minimal social impact. 
Taking these gaps into consideration, this article aims to contribute to the literature in 
three ways. First, it aims to contribute to the growing flexicurity literature by analysing 
the case of a firm and a corporation that have adopted flexicurity policies for more than 
four decades – even before the term flexicurity was invented. Second, it contributes to the 
study of the resilience of worker-owned organisations and considers both the managerial 
and worker-owner perspectives in specific circumstances arising from FED’s crisis and 
bankruptcy. Third, this article contributes to field of labour geography that explores how 
labour can shape labour markets, either proactively or through its reaction to the growing 
precariousness and flexibilisation of work. 
This paper’s main objective is to analyse the lights and shadows of flexicurity policies, 
based on the case of FED. The aims are (1) to contrast the validity of academic studies 
that attribute competitive advantages to flexicurity and (2) to analyse its limitations in 
social matters, shedding light on different agents’ resistance to flexicurity and their 
strategies to avoid it. 
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The paper is organised as follows. The next section offers a brief profile of the case-
studied organisation and a review of the literature related to understanding flexicurity 
policies in Mondragon cooperatives. This is followed by an outline of the research 
methods and then a summary of the fieldwork results. The final section is devoted to 
discussion and conclusions. 
CASE STUDY CONTEXT 
In 1956 five former students from a technical college in Mondragon created FED to 
produce heating devices and subsequently other home appliances. Three decades of 
internal growth made FED Mondragon’s biggest industrial cooperative and Spanish 
leader in the white goods industry. In 1989 it began a process of external acquisitions 
with the takeover of Spanish and European competitors. The biggest acquisitions were 
those of the Polish firm Wrozamet in 1999 and the French competitor Brandt in 2005 – a 
company as big as FED itself. In 2006 these acquisitions made FED Europe’s fifth largest 
firm in the white goods sector, employing a total workforce of 10,543. The opportunity 
to become cooperative members was not given to the workers of its 10 production plants 
based in six foreign countries. 
FED financed its growth strategy through borrowing; and despite the growth of its main 
markets in the 1996–2007 period, it operated with razor thin margins. When the demand 
for home appliances in its main markets collapsed in 2008, the company entered a sharp 
decline that ended in bankruptcy proceedings in November 2013. For a deeper historical 
review and a broader understanding of the reasons that generated FED’s demise, see, for 
example, Molina (2012), Errasti et al. (2016), Arando & Arenaza (2018) and Basterretxea 
et al. (2019, 2020). 
FED was part of the Mondragon Group – this group is comprised of close to 264 firms, 
98 of which are cooperatives and have 81,507 employees and a total revenue of 12,229 
million euro (Mondragon, 2020). Power, authority and ownership in Mondragon are 
decentralised in a federal or inverted pyramid organisational structure (Basterretxea et 
al., 2020). This inverted pyramid structure of autonomous cooperatives that cooperate 
voluntarily has an impact on how flexicurity policies are implemented. 
Mondragon created Lagun Aro in 1958, which is a social welfare system for cooperative 
worker-owners. The 26,759 Mondragon cooperative worker-owners are registered in the 
Spanish National Social Security System as self-employed workers, which means they 
do not pay social security contributions for unemployment insurance, nor do they receive 
social security unemployment benefits if they lose their jobs. In order to cope with the 
unemployment risk, Mondragon cooperatives pay fees into Lagun Aro. These fees are 
then used to pay unemployment benefits, to provide training to redundant worker-owners, 
to pay early retirement benefits to worker-members over 55 who are difficult to relocate 
due to poor training, and to reward and encourage cooperatives to relocate workers of 
over-staffed cooperatives. 
Literature on flexicurity and flexicurity measures in Mondragon 
cooperatives 
The main idea behind flexicurity is that labour flexibility and employment security should 
be mutually supportive and maintain a number of trade-offs, which involve individual 
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workers, groups of workers or entire workforces, business sectors or national governance 
systems (Wilthagen & Tros, 2004; Bredgaard et al., 2005; Gialis et al., 2014). 
This research follows the three flexicurity dimensions framed in Madsen’s (2004) golden 
triangle. To delimit the concept of flexible contractual arrangements of flexicurity (first 
dimension), this study relies on Casey et al.’s (1999) fourfold definition, which states that 
labour flexibility can be dimensioned in numerical, functional, financial and temporal 
terms. Regarding security, the flexicurity approach advocates a modern social security 
system and unemployment benefits that guarantee income (second dimension); and active 
labour market policies (third dimension), such as lifelong learning strategies, that ensure 
employability and reduce unemployment periods by facilitating the redistribution of 
unemployed workers (Domínguez, 2012). 
After appearing unintentionally in Denmark as a set of social commitments between 
labour market actors and the political system, flexicurity was implemented into German 
law in 1999 to benefit the most disadvantaged sectors. In 2000 it was incorporated into 
the European Employment Strategy, within the Lisbon Agenda for growth and jobs 
(Wilthagen & Tros, 2004). Since 2008 many governments, guided by the European 
Commission’s (2008) ‘mission for flexicurity’, have adopted flexicurity policies (Gialis 
et al., 2014; Gialis & Taylor, 2016). 
Southern European countries do not meet the institutional, political, socio-productive and 
welfare conditions of the countries where flexicurity originated. Thus, their 
implementation of flexicurity policies breaks the proportionality principle between 
flexibility and security (Fernández-Rodríguez et al., 2012; Gialis et al., 2014; López et 
al., 2014; Gialis & Taylor, 2016). In these countries flexibility has overwhelmed the 
concept of security (Domínguez, 2012), and they are now interchangeable terms 
(Fernández-Rodríguez et al., 2012). 
Among the negative impacts of flexicurity in Southern European countries, researchers 
consider that it increases temporariness (Domínguez, 2012), leads to the individualisation 
of labour protection and increases inequality (Harvey, 2006; Keune & Jepsen, 2007; 
López et al., 2014; Gialis & Taylor, 2016). 
The different flexicurity dimensions have been used by Mondragon cooperatives in 
different crises. This study presents them individually with their theoretical advantages 
and limitations. 
Numerical Flexibility 
Mondragon is permitted to have up to 25% of wage labourers in its 98 cooperatives. These 
firms have grown internationally since the early 1990s without offering employee 
ownership to employees in subsidiaries (see Mendizabal et al., 2005; Errasti, 2015). 
Therefore, only 26,759 of the 81,837 Mondragon employees in 2018 were worker-
owners. The remaining 67.3% were wage labourers with no ownership rights. 
When the 2008 crisis occurred, Mondragon cooperatives initially reduced the number of 
employees in subsidiaries, selling some subsidiaries and firing – or not renewing the 
contracts of – many temporary workers in the parent cooperatives (Errasti et al., 2016). 
Sometimes even successful cooperatives fire or do not renew temporary worker contracts 
in order to relocate redundant worker-members of other Mondragon cooperatives (Smith, 
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2001). Annual reports of Mondragon and its social welfare protection system Lagun Aro 
offer data on the role of external numerical flexibility for the 2007–2015 crisis period. 
Mondragon reached its employment peak in 2007 with 103,731 employees (Mondragon, 
2008) and between 2007 and 2015 this number was reduced by almost 30% to a total of 
74,335 employees (Mondragon, 2015). In the same period the number of worker-owners 
was reduced much less, by 8.1% (Lagun Aro, 2007, 2015), mainly by not replacing retired 
older members. 
With the exception of Kasmir (2016), most of the Mondragon literature overlooks the role 
of external numerical flexibility (e.g., Albizu & Basterretxea, 1998; Arando & Arenaza, 
2018). When presenting other kinds of labour flexibility – such as functional flexibility, 
relocations or working time flexibility – researchers also overlook that these types of 
labour flexibility often involve making many non-members redundant. 
Functional Flexibility and Relocations 
Functional labour flexibility is a firm’s capacity to employ multi-skilled workers that can 
fill different positions when needed (Albizu & Basterretxea, 1998). The statutory right to 
work in Mondragon cooperatives is exercised by considering that a member’s main right 
is the right to employment, while adjusting it to a member’s professional competence 
becomes a subsidiary right (Basterretxea & Albizu, 2010). As a result, each cooperative 
may internally apply functional mobility of its members in emergency situations or for 
technological or economic reasons (Albizu & Basterretxea, 1998). 
A common solution among cooperatives in the same geographical area or division is the 
geographical mobility of members from overstaffed cooperatives to others in need of 
staff, through temporary relocations. Only when the unemployment situation of a 
cooperative with an excess workforce is irreversible, does Mondragon favour turning 
temporary relocations into permanent ones (Basterretxea & Albizu, 2010). Functional 
flexibility and relocations are profusely applied even in times of economic prosperity, 
thus balancing cooperatives’ different staff needs (Smith, 2001; Errasti, 2015; Errasti et 
al., 2017). 
Broader research on functional flexibility and relocations (Martin et al., 2000; 
Mendenhall et al., 2002; Mignonac, 2002; Sikora et al., 2004; van Dam, 2005) highlights 
that those processes can generate negative attitudinal responses in employees. The 
uncertainty particularly created by relocations is highly stressful and creates anxiety 
(Riemer, 2000) because they can lead to unwanted job changes, a need for retraining, 
being a greater distance from home or to a change in work environment and roles 
(Matthiesen, 2005). On the other hand, functional flexibility is often linked to higher 
satisfaction, mainly when it is combined with job training and job enrichment (Origo & 
Pagani, 2008). Nevertheless, the literature also considers that functional flexibility can 
cause emotional burnout, especially in situations of high demand for work or inadequate 
information (Goudswaard, 2003). 
Financial or Wage Flexibility 
In Mondragon the wage policy is subordinate to employment creation and business 
profitability. In times of crisis, cooperative firms frequently reduce their members’ wages 
by 10%, 20% or even 30% in critical cases (Basterretxea & Albizu, 2010). In the crises 
of the 1970s, 80s and 90s, this wage flexibility offered a competitive advantage against 
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its Spanish non-cooperative competitors, see, for example, Bradley & Gelb (1987) or 
Logan (1988). 
Most studies cited on Mondragon’s employment policy tend to remark on the positive 
effects of wage flexibility on competitiveness (e.g., Elortza et al., 2012; Landeta et al., 
2016), largely overlooking the possible negative effects on members’ attitudes and 
behaviours. They also stress that worker-members are the ones that vote in their 
cooperative’s general assembly to reduce their salaries, something that is considered as a 
clear sign of commitment (Logan, 1988; Cheney, 1999). Salary reductions in cooperatives 
are easier, researchers argue, since the employer–employee agency relationship is 
eliminated, therefore avoiding the risk of the principal’s opportunism and allowing an 
internalisation process of workers’ objectives into the objective function of a firm 
(Navarra & Tortia, 2014). The cited scholarly literature focused on Mondragon tends to 
overlook that the decision and discussion processes of cooperatives voting to reduce their 
members’ salaries are often painful and conflictual (Basterretxea et al., 2020). Some 
recent studies point to wage flexibility as a factor to explain lower satisfaction and higher 
sick absence rates among worker-owners than among employees without ownership in 
some large Mondragon cooperatives such as Eroski (Basterretxea & Storey, 2018) and 
FED (Basterretxea et al., 2019). 
Temporal Flexibility 
Flexibilisation of work schedules is a generalised measure adopted by Mondragon 
cooperatives when their activity decreases in times of crisis (Basterretxea & Albizu, 
2010). According to the Displaced and Mobile Work Schedule Regulation (Mondragon, 
1998), the cooperative manager – after informing the Social Council (SC) and the 
workers, and with the approval of the Governing Council (GC) – may reduce working 
hours or the number of working days per week for its members. In the case of FED, non-
worked hours could be accumulated for a maximum of one year. There was an obligation 
to make up the hours if there was an increase in activity in the following year, with a 
maximum of 10 working hours per day. If after that time those hours were not made up, 
Lagun Aro assumed them as unemployment hours. Together with external numerical 
flexibility, this is cooperatives’ first resort strategy in a demand crisis (Basterretxea & 
Albizu, 2010). 
Some Mondragon cooperatives, instead of reducing working hours in times of crisis, opt 
to increase worker-owners’ working hours without increasing their salary (solidary 
overtime), thus reducing the need for temporary workers. For example, the retailer Eroski 
approved to increase working hours of its almost 9,000 worker-owners by 10% in 2009 
(Basterretxea & Storey, 2018). 
While researchers on Mondragon seem to overlook the possible negative effects of 
working time flexibility, the following broader literature considers them. When 
voluntary, working time flexibility helps job satisfaction and mental health (Gregory & 
Milner, 2009). However, this flexibility guided by market needs (Hildebrandt, 2006), 
together with the risks associated with overtime, disruption of family and social life 
(Golden, 2015), and intensification of work (Gregory & Milner, 2009) and stress, leads 
to a negative work–life balance (White et al., 2003). Nevertheless, the Displaced and 
Mobile Work Schedule Regulation (Mondragon, 1998), to which this study’s authors had 
access, highlights the advantages that this model provides, not only in times of crisis, but 
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also in coping with peaks in demand or seasonal demands, such as those in the fridges 
unit. 
As can be seen, labour flexibility measures can lead to employee disruption due to a firm’s 
perceived breach of contract (Rousseau, 1995). This may reduce their commitment (Black 
& Lynch, 2004); increase their turnover, absenteeism and performance problems 
(Basterretxea et al., 2019); or provoke a defeatist attitude toward work and a greater desire 
to leave their job (van Dam, 2003). Moreover, the disappearance of work routines due to 
labour flexibility leads to psychological, physical and social disruption (Brett et al., 1992).  
As Origo & Pagani (2008) underline, the impact of different forms of flexible work 
arrangement on job satisfaction heavily depends on whether they are freely chosen by a 
worker or whether they are imposed by employers or by contextual factors. As in many 
other cooperatives (see, for example, Smith (2001) about La Lega, or Ugarte et al. (2009) 
about Irizar), flexible work arrangements in Mondragon are decided by worker-members; 
however, these arrangements are mainly influenced by adverse economic conditions. 
Mixed effects on partners’ attitudes and behaviours are thus expected to be found. 
Social Security System and Unemployment Benefits 
Firms can achieve flexibility without detrimental effects on workers’ satisfaction if 
policies aimed at favouring the use of flexible contracts are coupled with policies aimed 
at enhancing employment stability (Origo & Pagani, 2009). 
Offering employment security to employees increases their commitment, satisfaction, 
wellbeing and health (Tsui et al., 1997); leads to a better acceptance of relocations and 
functional flexibility (Ostroff & Clark, 2001); and to an improvement in both their work 
performance and (indirectly) to company productivity (Freeman, 1978). Unemployment 
benefits are among the measures to increase workers’ perceived job security (Green, 
2009). Providing workers with a long-term employment perspective increases their 
willingness to invest their time and effort in a firm (Hashimoto, 1981). 
Since the creation of Lagun Aro, cooperative worker-owners have achieved very high 
levels of employment security in exchange for their acceptance of labour flexibility. 
Several researches confirm that employment security is the single most important 
satisfaction factor for Mondragon cooperatives’ partners (Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014). 
Active Labour Market Policies and Lifelong Learning 
Functional flexibility required in each cooperative and the relocations among 
cooperatives both demand a high level of multi-skilled capability from members (Landeta 
et al., 2016). These members are forced to switch to new tasks as well as to new 
companies and, sometimes, even to a new business sector; so adaptation is easier when 
members have gone through solid generic training (Basterretxea & Albizu, 2010). Of the 
relocations that occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s, mainly workers who had obtained 
at least second cycle qualifications from vocational training schools were able to become 
permanently relocated; therefore, Mondragon promoted extensive vocational training 
programmes to facilitate relocations of members with primary education (Basterretxea & 
Albizu, 2010; Landeta et al., 2016). 
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In the case of FED, functional flexibility and relocations have been implemented without 
adequate training support, as can be seen from the fact that a large portion of FED’s 
workforce had no vocational training (Basterretxea et al., 2019). This raises the question 
of whether it can be called functional flexibility, or whether it should be considered a poor 
version of it; this question is further discussed in the discussion and conclusions section. 
METHODS 
Due to the subject’s complexity, this paper has adopted an exploratory qualitative 
methodology (Glesne, 2006), like that of the contemporary case study. The study’s nature 
is holistic, instrumental, exploratory and explanatory. 
The quantitative information was extracted from a large amount of longitudinal, internal 
and public data, close to FED’s closing period. The most relevant public information was 
analysed, coming from journalistic and academic articles as well as Lagun Aro (2007–
2019) and Mondragon (2008, 2015, 2020) annual reports. Internal corporate FED and 
Mondragon management reports and regulations were also compiled, for example, the 
Absenteeism Report of 2005 (Fagor Electrodomésticos, 2006) or the Displaced and 
Mobile Work Schedule Regulation (Mondragon, 1998). 
The qualitative data was obtained from field work based on 40 in-depth interviews with 
a representative and reliable pool of FED internal and external stakeholders during its fall 
and in the relocation stage. Theoretical, purposive and snowball sampling (Patton, 2002), 
in addition to the recommendation of or allusion to the interviewees, were used to define 
the sample. Unlike other research that has focused solely on a manager's opinion, these 
interviews included contributions from 20 former senior FED managers (3 GC 
representatives and 2 SC members); 13 worker-owners (4 leading SC representatives and 
6 members of platforms of those affected by FED’s closure); a senior union official who 
supported non-owner workers through the collapse; 3 senior managers from Mondragon 
headquarters; 4 senior Basque Government officials responsible for industrial policy; and 
a researcher from Mondragon University. This increases the richness and reliability of 
the information collected (Miles et al., 2014), covering the various interests at stake 
(Glesne, 2006). 
A semi-structured script was developed based on the conceptual framework studied, and 
it was modified as the field work progressed (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). To obtain more 
feedback from the interviewees, key quantitative data and input from previous 
interviewees were presented to them. The interviews lasted between 90 and 170 minutes 
and were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The study’s uniquely academic motivation, 
the diversity among the interviewees and their anonymity were guaranteed, thus avoiding 
the participants’ organisational silence (Morrison & Milliken, 2000) and social 
desirability (Nederhof, 1985). Possible methodological biases related to the catharsis 
involved for the interviewee to deal with a traumatic experience were considered (Heras-
Saizarbitoria, 2014). The data collection from the fieldwork ceased at the theoretical 
saturation point, when the marginal contribution of each interview began to decrease 
(Miles et al., 2014). 
The diversity of information sources guarantees the factors’ validity and led to 
contextualisation and interpretation of the case through abductive reasoning, with an 
interactive compromise between empirical material and theory (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 
2012). The information was triangulated and analysed as suggested in the literature (Miles 
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et al., 2014), through an iterative process of categorisation, interpretation, discussion and 
explanation (Glesne, 2006). An inductive analytical approach was used with great 
potential for qualitative content analysis of the collected data (Glaser & Strauss, 2017). 
Key findings were synthesised and representative passages and quantitative descriptive 
figures were included to better illustrate the object of study. Internal validity is ensured 
by shared patterns explaining the event. As recommended in the literature (Gibbert et al., 
2008), in order to increase the reliability of the study’s analysis of the interviews, one 
peer (who was not a co-author of the paper) independently analysed the interview 
transcripts and discussed and reviewed the draft paper. With the same purpose in mind, a 
draft review was also made by a key informant in April 2020. 
RESULTS 
In the following sections the advantages and limitations that flexicurity has had in dealing 
with the management of the surplus of FED partners are addressed. The results are divided 
into the pre (2005–2013) and post (2014–2019) FED closing stages. 
Flexicurity before FED closure 
Numerical Flexibility 
External numerical flexibility differed according to the different categories of workers 
employed by FED. 
FED reached its worker-owners peak in 2004 with 3,520 members. Between 2004 and 
2013 this number was reduced by almost 50% to a total of 1,895 members (Basterretxea 
et al., 2019). This reduction was achieved mainly through not replacing retired members 
and promoting early retirement. Since 2010 the early retirement age decreased from 61 
to 58. Many interviewees consider early retirement as a precarious measure. Lagun Aro 
offers 80% of the salary to those members affected by early retirement. Given that salaries 
were cut by 20% in the years leading up to the firm’s closure, members who were affected 
by early retirement are receiving 64% of the salary they earned before the crisis began. 
There was no union representation of temporary workers in the parent cooperative and 
given that the majority of them wanted to become members, they were usually docile and 
quite uncritical when demanding their rights as workers (Amado-Borthayre, 2009). 
Therefore, not renewing their contracts in Basque factories was less conflictual than in 
nearby large unionised investor-owned firms. 
The peak of employees without ownership rights (7,150) was reached in 2006 after the 
acquisition of the French competitor Brandt. In 2012 only 3,606 remained, most of them 
in French and Polish subsidiaries. Other FED production plants around the world in 2013 
are shown in Figure 1. For more information on FED’s organisation chart, see 







Figure 1: FED’s production plants in 2013. 
 
FED had a 30% equity participation in another production plant in 
Shanghai (China). 
Source: Data gathered from interviews. 
Interviewees highlight that FED’s plans to cut jobs at the French subsidiary Brandt were 
difficult to implement. Brandt’s union culture and French labour legislation were 
unanimously cited as factors that slowed projected adjustment plans and made them much 
more expensive. Conflicts, work stoppages and strikes across Brandt facilities happened 
whenever jobs were at stake (Errasti et al., 2016; Kasmir, 2018). Despite union 
opposition, close to 2,300 job losses happened in Fagor-Brandt in the 2006–2013 period, 
via layoff proceedings, non-renewal of temporary contracts, natural and early retirements, 
agreed withdrawals, dismissals and the transfer of production plants to other firms (Errasti 
et al., 2016). 
French unions sought solidarity with FED’s SC members to prevent layoffs and to create 
integrated trans-spatial strategies of resistance, as unions often do in different sectors (see 
Gialis & Herod, 2014). They soon found that solidarity was impossible. The special 
labour agency of FED members, given their dual condition of workers and owners, 
impeded collaboration. 
French unions called me to a meeting in which they proposed to have a 
relationship with us. I was honest and told them we couldn’t have a conventional 
union relationship because I was a partner. I took part in the decision to buy 
Brandt. So the relationship that I was going to have with the French union was 
that of a (owner) member. I told them: ‘I can’t share information with you 
because I have a conflict of interest, and I’m going to defend the Mondragon 
jobs. And if at any given time a Brandt factory has to be closed, however hard 
it is, it will be closed before a Mondragon one’. (SC Member) 
12 
 
When FED implemented an adjustment plan in its Polish subsidiary in 2008, efforts of 
the Polish union Sierpen 80 to develop trans-spatial solidarity actions were also rejected 
by FED’s worker-owners, who sought to defend jobs in Mondragon (see also Errasti et 
al., 2016; Kasmir, 2018). 
Functional Flexibility via Relocation 
Even before the 2008 crisis, some FED business units were running at a loss (Basterretxea 
et al., 2020). In 2005 losses of the business unit producing fridges reached 14.5 million 
euro; the washing machines unit lost 6.4 million and the dishwashing machines unit 4.2 
million (Fagor Electrodomésticos, 2006). A FED manager and SC and GC member 
reports that heavy losses in the fridges unit forced the company to reduce this unit’s staff 
from 903 workers in December 2005 to 375 in June 2008. These redundant members were 
relocated to other units and other nearby Mondragon cooperatives. The interviewees in 
this study highlight that those early relocations and other measures to try to make the 
fridges unit profitable again were decided by a committee of 70 fridges unit worker-
owners. This democratic decision making, and the fact that most relocations of the 2006–
2008 period took place in other cooperatives of the same Mondragon town, diminished 
worker resistance to relocations. Instead, the massive relocations of the 2010–2013 period 
were slower than planned because of the working member resistance to them. Several 
interviewees, from managers to SC members, agree that this strong resistance was 
because many members experienced relocations ‘as a drama’. There were four main 
reasons for this: (1) a culture with a high sense of belonging to each business unit; (2) 
fear of uncertainty and routine change. Fear was greater when worker-owners were 
relocated to very different tasks in distant cooperatives that asked for longer commuting 
time and worsened their work–life balance; 
People were alarmed, they said: ‘Damn it! My life is going to fall apart! I make 
fridges. I know what I do. I know how to do it. And now what are they going to 
do with me? […] Are they going to relocate me to another cooperative and to a 
different job? […] How am I going to do that? Will they respect my schedule? I 
have young children!’ or ‘I’m 55 years old and now I have to learn other new 
jobs? What’s going to happen to me?’ That’s what I sensed, that was the fear, 
the restlessness. People didn’t internalise that ‘I have to go where the work is’ 
almost until the end. […] From the SC we also put up barriers to relocations. 
They were our last option. (SC Member) 
(3) the fact that, according to the interviewees, most FED worker-owners never thought 
the company could go bankrupt and assumed Mondragon Corporation would never allow 
its most important industrial cooperative to fail. This false sense of security reinforced 
individual and collective resistance to relocations; and (4) the fact that when many 
supervisors had to decide who was to be relocated, they maintained their team’s best 
performers and relocated those worker-members with worse performances. Thus, being 
named for relocation created a negative stigma. 
This kind of attitude was the natural way for members to protect themselves 
from the ploys of the management to declare relocatable the one they did not 
like. (FED Manager and SC and GC Member) 
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Besides active resistance to relocations through worker-owners’ representatives in the 
SC, multiple individual acts of resilience (Katz, 2004) slowed down the relocation 
process. 
Some members avoided being relocated to other cooperatives on the grounds of a work 
disability. In 2005, 279 FED members (8.1% of the total) had a work disability (Figure 
2). According to plant managers and human resources (HR) managers, this made 
relocations difficult. The percentage of members with any kind of disability almost 
doubled to 15.6% in 2013. According to the interviewees, those percentages were much 
higher among blue-collar worker-owners. 
Figure 2: FED partners with disabilities by age group in 2005. 
 
Source: Fagor Electrodomésticos (2006). 
FED’s internal medical service was responsible for evaluating worker-members’ 
disabilities and for providing internal medical documents acknowledging a disability that 
prevented them from performing certain jobs. These documents were used internally and 
were unofficially known as papeles médicos; they are often mentioned in the interviews. 
The high levels of worker-owners with a disability are partially explained by the FED 
recruitment policy social goals that explicitly promoted the integration of disabled 
candidates. There is nevertheless an almost unanimous opinion among the interviewees 
about the hidden fraud behind the use of papeles médicos as a barrier against functional 
flexibility, relocations and flexible schedules. Interviewees also criticise that the internal 
medical service granted these disability recognitions too easily. 
When everything started to fall, they asked for papeles médicos. [...] ‘Am I going 
to be relocated? I’ll say I’ve got tendinitis; I’ll go to the factory doctor; he’ll sign 
me a papel médico, and I will elude relocation. How are they going to relocate 
me where there’s a vacancy if I’m not going to be able to work? [...] They will 
assign me some simple tasks and then another member will be candidate for 
relocation’. What culture is being generated, especially at the workshop level? 
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Well, the next candidate says: ‘Me too!’, ‘The last one is a rotten egg!’. (SC 
Member) 
Interviewees also describe a culture of relocation denial that forced the HR department to 
relocate partners from more profitable lines: 
When trying to relocate partners from deficit lines, you reached a point where 
you had got to the bottom of the matter. You had already removed [from the list 
of relocations], those who could retire, those over 55 and those who had taken 
the reduction in working hours who could not be relocated by regulation. So 
you had to relocate partners from other lines or chains that were profitable. 
(FED Manager) 
The percentages of members with papeles médicos were higher among the direct 
workforce and in some specific business units. A FED manager and SC and GC member 
reports that during the first relocations, between 2005 and 2006, 35% of the direct 
workforce in the fridges unit had papeles médicos. These members could not be easily 
relocated to other tasks and business units, let alone other cooperatives. 
According to a SC member, the number of members with papeles médicos became such 
that a section known internally as Txagorritxu (the name of a large hospital near 
Mondragon) was set up with non-relocatable members who carried out simple tasks at a 
loss. 
When FED was closed, more than 250 partners had some kind of disability to 
work, what we called here papel médico. So sometimes we just made up 
positions for that kind of person. There were loss-making simple assembling 
and disassembling sections for these people, and those sections got larger and 
larger. (FED Manager and SC and GC Member) 
As previously analysed by Basterretxea et al. (2019) absenteeism rates increased 
significantly in the last two decades of FED’s history, from 4% until mid-1990s to 8.8% 
in 2010. Sick absence increased significantly in 2009 and 2010 when the firm was 
implementing massive relocations. According to some interviewees, sick absence was 
also a way for many members to avoid relocations. 
Another barrier some members used to avoid being relocated to other cooperatives was 
to adhere to FED’s Law on the Reconciliation of Family Life and Work. When the 
application of this regulation caused changes in relocation candidates’ working hours that 
the receiving cooperatives could not deal with, candidates remained in their home 
cooperative. 
Many partners chose to reduce their workday when they started seeing storm 
clouds ahead. When there were rumours of people being made redundant, 
many said: ‘No, I'm taking care of my children. I'm only going to work four hours 
and that will exempt me from relocation’. (SC Member) 
Some interviewees stress that relocation policies were also offered to managers. Firing or 
demoting underperforming managers or those who repeatedly made poor investment 
decisions was very difficult because they were cooperative members. Many rank and file 
interviewees criticise that even these managers, with the most responsibility for FED’s 
15 
 
failure, were the first to be relocated to other cooperatives and even promoted to higher 
positions in Mondragon, where their performance often remains low. 
Financial or Wage Flexibility 
FED members agreed to stop receiving interest and extraordinary payments and to reduce 
their salaries progressively. As Basterretxea et al. (2019, 2020) highlight, the debates on 
salary cuts in annual general assemblies were highly conflictual and often members voted 
against reducing their wages or voted in favour of reducing them by steady margins. 
Nevertheless, salaries were reduced year by year until reaching a 20% salary decrease in 
May 2013. 
There was a kind of unwritten social pact which said: ‘I accept salary cuts as 
an effort, but here there is no lack of work, here nobody gets the sack [...] and 
nowadays that’s a privilege that nobody has’. (SC Member) 
In a sign of high inter-cooperation and solidarity, cooperative members of another 110 
Mondragon cooperatives voted in May 2013 to reduce their salaries in order to award a 
70-million-euro loan to FED. Consequently, most of these cooperatives’ worker-
members reduced their salaries by 1%, while the Fagor Group cooperatives’ reduction 
was by 6.48%. 
Wage flexibility usually affects worker-members at parent cooperatives and does not 
apply to wage labourers in subsidiaries. That was not the case in FED’s Polish subsidiary, 
Wrozamet, where a reduction of wages was agreed in 2008. Wage cuts were negotiated 
with the union Solidarity but generated strong opposition from Sierpen 80, strikes, 
conflict and labour unrest (Errasti et al., 2016). 
Temporal Flexibility 
It is noticeable that the use of flexible calendars became the flexicurity tool that received 
most support from FED members and the SC between 2007 and 2013. According to the 
regulations in force, Lagun Aro covered 80% of the salary corresponding to the hours not 
worked and not subsequently made up (Bradley & Gelb, 1987). In the 1970s, 80s and 90s 
crises, flexible schedules had been a source of competitive advantage for cooperatives 
because members recovered the hours not worked in the months and years after the crisis, 
see, for example, Whyte & Whyte (1988) or Clamp (2003). That was not the case this 
time; the prolongation and deepening of the crisis from 2007 until the disappearance of 
the company in 2013 meant that the hours not worked (but paid) could not be recovered 
in following years. Some interviewees point out that some business unit partners, such as 
those of Fagor Mueble, owed more than 1,000 hours of work per capita. Working time 
flexibility should be used to alleviate transitory difficulties, not to perpetuate a firm’s 
structural problems, interviewees argue. 
We voted to reduce our working hours, close the factories two weeks in Easter 
instead of one, 45 days in summer instead of one month, or even not to work 
on Fridays for a whole year. Those non worked hours were paid even if we 
were often unable to make them up. These working time flexibility measures 
are fine as a solution for short crises like the ones in the past. But for one as 
long as this it is a mistake because you are just postponing a decision you have 
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to make, because otherwise these measures will lead to closure and vitiate 
people. (SC Member) 
Situation of flexicurity after the closure of FED 
In October 2013, the 5,600 workers that remained at FED fell into three categories: 1,895 
worker-members and 200 temporary workers on short-term contracts in Spain, and 3,500 
workers in international subsidiaries. 
The different agents (former FED members, host cooperatives, Mondragon Corporation 
and Lagun Aro) took different positions and measures to protect FED’s 1,895 
unemployed members. In contrast, the jobs and incomes of temporary workers and 
subsidiary employees were unprotected. Foreign subsidiaries were closed or were bought 
by competitors (Cevital bought Brandt and Bosch-Siemens bought Wrozamet) only to 
reopen with severely reduced workforces (see also Kasmir, 2016; Errasti et al., 2016). 
Mondragon’s Protection of Former Members 
Mondragon prioritised the management of partners’ positions and designed an immediate 
action plan. 
Social security system and unemployment benefits of Lagun Aro 
Fees to cover unemployment in Mondragon cooperatives have been historically lower 
than the fees conventional Spanish firms contribute to the National Social Security, 
providing a long-term competitive advantage via lower social costs over capitalist 
companies (Whyte & Whyte, 1988; Ormaechea, 1998; Basterretxea & Albizu, 2010). 
Before the crisis, in the 2000–2007 period, the Mondragon cooperatives’ unemployment 
insurance fee remained at an average of 1%, far below the 7.05% unemployment 
insurance fee for workers affiliated to the Spanish National Social Security System 
(Basterretxea & Albizu, 2010). As Table 1 shows, this competitive advantage has 













Table 1: Unemployment payments and benefits in Mondragon (in thousands of euro). 





2007 1.00% 6,635 1,690 3,226 5,099 68,067 
2008 1.00% 7,023 1,869 7,448 1,444 69,511 
2009 1.00% 6,992 1,261 23,209 - 14,956 54,555 
2010 2.00% 11,909 167 18,043 - 5,967 48,588 
2011 2.00% 13,812 86 21,492 - 7,594 40,994 
2012 2.00% 13,742 1,193 19,006 - 4,071 36,923 
2013 3.00% 18,712 1,559 30,438 - 10,167 26,756 
2014 6.50% 43,831 325 43,502 654 27,410 
2015 6.50% 43,687 134 32,528 11,293 38,703 
2016 6.50% 43,783 469 25,666 18,586 57,289 
2017 6.00% 41,640 1,659 23,150 20,149 77,438 
2018 5.50% 23,415 - 1,150 22,265 - 77,438 
2019 5.50% 38,350 2,770 21,870 19,250 96,688 
Source: Lagun Aro (2007–2019). Annual Reports. 
In the previous crises of the 1980s and 1990s, relocations and flexible calendars were 
prioritised, and early retirement was the last resort due to its economic impact (Bradley 
& Gelb, 1987; Landeta et al., 2016). That was not the case in the 2008–2015 crisis. Due 
to the Taylorist production systems at FED, training requirements for basic blue-collar 
positions were scarce and hundreds of FED worker-members did not have a vocational 
training qualification (Basterretxea et al., 2019). A result of this has been that relocations 
to other cooperatives have been difficult, especially the relocation of older members. 
Thus, as Table 2 shows, early retirement is the biggest cost of Lagun Aro’s employment 
policy between 2007 and 2019. The second most costly measure is that of unemployment 
benefits and benefits for those members affected by flexible schedules who were unable 
to make up hours not worked. In opposition to previous crises, voluntary redundancy of 







Table 2: Expenditure in Mondragon flexicurity and employment policy benefits 2007–2019 (in 
thousands of euro). 





201 3,236 10,745 1,021 4,882 2,887 11,280 15,415 5,023 3,448 1,892 2,024 2,573 64,627 
Temporary 
relocations 299 376 2,191 2,778 1,423 1,464 2,229 7,160 6,597 5,076 4,756 5,347 5,188 44,884 
Permanent 
relocations 609 109 297 607 3,919 3,150 5,695 6,065 1,433 3,639 4,805 5,174 5,486 40,988 
Early 
retirement 1,985 3,263 9,015 10,520 10,881 10,682 10,261 14,594 14,662 12,472 11,126 9,057 6,850 125,368 
Severance pay 132 464 961 3,117 437 823 973 169 4,605 855 439 608 1,758 15,341 
Vocational 
retraining plan - - - - - - 97 97 198 177 133 56 10 768 
Source: Lagun Aro (2007–2019). Annual Reports. 
In addition to relocating members in other cooperatives, 350 former FED members were 
hired in 2014 by a Spanish competitor, CNA-Cata, that continued to produce white goods 
products in some of FED’s former factories and to use the Fagor brand (Arando & 
Arenaza, 2018). CNA-Cata failed to make this relaunch profitable and most relocated 
worker-members re-joined Mondragon in 2017 and 2018. 
Arando & Arenaza (2018) used data on the number of former FED members affected by 
different flexicurity measures to highlight the adequacy of these policies in providing 
solutions for redundant former FED members. Through information gathered from 
several interviews, we see how, by early 2021, flexicurity had provided a response to 
1070 former members in terms of relocations, and to 881 former members in terms of 
retirement, early retirement, voluntary redundancies or unpaid sabbatical leaves. 
To make relocations possible, Mondragon created an employment office and an 
instrumental cooperative, called Udalaitz. The employment office was represented by 
members of the Mondragon HR department, the FED personnel department and a Lagun 
Aro representative. Its tasks were to (Arando & Arenaza, 2018): 
• Classify unemployed partners based on their attitudes and skills. 
• Analyse the supply and demand for employment in the cooperatives and look for 
jobs that match these partner profiles. 
• Create jobs in other cooperatives and new value-added activities, such as the after-




• Encourage the relocation of members with social, functional or training problems 
through retraining programmes and the subsidy of their salary costs subject to 
their consolidation. 
The instrumental cooperative Udalaitz was established at the end of 2014; it welcomed 
former FED members as its own members, allowing them to receive their payroll and the 
aid from Lagun Aro. In addition, it manages relocations by administering the curricula 
vitae and histories of the members and assigns them to the cooperatives that require 
workers (Arando & Arenaza, 2018). 
Perception of former FED partners toward the protection of Mondragon and the 
consolidation of inter-cooperation 
Thanks to flexicurity measures, only 56 former FED members remained unemployed in 
early 2021. Far from being critical of some aspects of the flexicurity measures in general, 
and relocations in particular, most interviewees highlight that those measures are much 
better than unemployment: 
I've lived through a company closure and haven't been unemployed at all. I 
haven't missed a single month. [...] I've been able to feed my family. [...] I have 
not gone through 700 interviews. [...] Before the closure of FED I went to the 
personnel department and asked if they needed people in another cooperative 
of Mondragon. They said: ‘Of course, give me your CV’. [...] They interviewed 
me at the other cooperative and I went in the first time. That's a strength. (SC 
Member) 
The interviewees also highlight that high levels of inter-cooperation among Mondragon 
cooperatives have helped to mitigate the social cost of FED’s bankruptcy. 
Some interviewed managers consider the flexicurity policies and their results as a 
complete success story, which is in line with previous researchers such as Arando & 
Arenaza (2018). Nevertheless, many interviewed rank and file worker-owners, their 
representatives in the SC and also several middle line managers are much more critical. 
They highlight that by early 2021, more than seven years after FED’s demise, about 40% 
of the mentioned relocations were still of temporary basis. 
There is a lot of demagoguery about this in Mondragon, they say: ‘We have 
provided a solution for 2,000 workers.’ But many solutions have been early 
retirements, voluntary leaves. [...] The number of definitive relocations is not 
that great. It is not enough to be proud of or to say in a press conference or an 
interview that ‘the Mondragon cooperative system is strong and powerful 
because it has managed to relocate all those who have left FED’. (SC Member) 
In addition, a SC member criticises cases where, if a former member – due to the delay 
in their relocation – finds work outside the Mondragon Corporation, Udalaitz notes it as 
a new success story. 
The interviewees point out the existence of worse working conditions in the host 
cooperatives for those temporarily relocated members, who feel as if they are working for 
a temporary employment agency: 
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Being the Temp Agency of Mondragon is not a solution. Maybe it's a better 
solution than staying home unemployed, but you can't say it's a solution. (FED 
Manager and GC Member) 
There is a great feeling of unhappiness among temporary relocated former FED 
members. The Mondragon cooperatives that temporarily relocate them think: ‘I 
don't have the obligation to consolidate you in my staff. I have you as a 
temporary employee and if tomorrow the workload goes down, the day after 
that you ain’t coming’, as in any Temp Agency. [...] Inertia leads to giving the 
worst jobs to relocated partners. (SC Member) 
Many former FED members are relocated for several months to one cooperative, then are 
unemployed for several months, and afterwards are relocated to the same or an alternative 
cooperative. Interviewed relocated members fear that many members will consume the 
maximum two-year unemployment benefit that Lagun Aro provides. 
If you are relocated temporarily for six months and you are unemployed for 
another three months, it is like Chinese water torture, little by little, one day you 
have wasted the two years. (SC Member) 
Some of the interviewees have been temporarily relocated for up to six years in the same 
cooperative. They argue that relocated members suffer underpaid inequity, often they do 
not receive salary increases linked to performance evaluations and also suffer inequities 
when it comes to sick absence and overtime pay. 
Some permanent solutions, such as pre-retirement and early retirement, are also criticised 
by interviewees, given that they suppose a sharp reduction of income. 
End of Former Partners’ Resistance to Relocations 
The interviewees consider that after FED’s fall, there was a change in the scale of values 
of many members who had previously resisted relocation. Likewise, Lagun Aro began to 
sanction, with a three-month cut in salary, any former partner who refused to be relocated. 
Interviewed managers point out that many members who had used their papeles médicos 
and their supposed disability to avoid relocation, voluntarily asked to have their papeles 
médicos removed. Udalaitz also commissioned an external medical team to analyse all 
partners who had a recognised disability at the closure of FED to see which ones had a 
real limitation that prevented them from being relocated. 
When FED was closed, we had more than 250 members who could not work, 
and one of the first decisions we made was to have an external medical check-
up. [...] After that medical examination, the number of members who really had 
some kind of disability went from 250 to 51. [...] This is a fact that tells a lot of 
things. (FED Manager and SC and GC Member) 
80% of the members who claimed to have a disability have experienced a 
miraculous cure, and I'm very happy that now they have another approach to 
life! People who for many years said they couldn't do many jobs, now do any 




Barriers of other Cooperatives to Relocation after FED’s Fall 
Senior managers and SC members expose a resistance to the consolidation of temporary 
relocated members into permanent ones by some host cooperatives. The main reasons for 
this are summarised below. 
Fear of loss of staff flexibility 
Many interviewees underline that staff flexibility is an important argument of other 
cooperatives which are not willing to consolidate temporarily relocated FED members 
into their workforce: 
Uncertainty is the main issue. Many Mondragon cooperatives have workload 
problems. The fall of FED helped them to understand that they have to be very 
careful when increasing staff and there is such a psychosis [...] So for them it's 
worth having a temp worker instead of a consolidated member. (SC Member) 
Dismissal of temporary employees 
According to managers and SC members, Mondragon’s request to the cooperatives to 
give unemployed former FED members the vacancies covered by temporary employees 
and candidates for membership has generated some situations of rejection in the receiving 
cooperatives. 
Imagine that your son is 20 years old and has studied mechanics. He can't find 
work in the area, so you think: ‘He may get hired in the cooperative because 
there's a place for him [...]’. And then you are told: ‘Your son's gonna stay out 
of the cooperative because we're gonna host a relocated FED member’. Then 
you say: ‘Relocated members suck’. This is very easy to perceive. I've been 
relocated for almost seven years now, and I still have to hear these things. (SC 
Member) 
Some successful cooperatives demand to cover only half of their eventual positions with 
FED relocated members and to keep the other half free for their eventual workers. A 
manager in one of these cooperatives justifies this: 
In many host Mondragon cooperatives, relocations have not created jobs, but 
have changed their nature. [...] Relocations are our commitment to Mondragon. 
[...] But we also have a commitment to the region where our cooperative is 
located, where there are unemployed people. That has to make the difference. 
(Mondragon Manager) 
Negative attitude of former FED partners 
FED suffered high absenteeism levels for a long time and a complacent culture made 
shirking easier for many members (Basterretxea et al., 2019). The poor perception that 
many members of other Mondragon cooperatives had about FED’s culture has made 
relocations more difficult. A manager of a cooperative relocating many former FED 
worker-owners illustrates it: 
We have had our very, very big doubts and suspicions about the people coming 
from FED. We've met some very good people and some very bad people. We 
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have expelled 11 relocated people from FED because they were not meeting 
minimum commitments. Some cases have been very representative of the 
‘FED Model’, like a member faking sickness absence. [...] They would do that 
at FED anyway, but not here. (Mondragon Manager) 
From the other perspective, former FED SC members have spoken about their perception 
of being rejected in other cooperatives where they have been relocated to: 
We have just closed down a company, and on top of that we have asked the 
whole Mondragon Corporation for money, we have indebted other 
cooperatives, [...] everything in vain, finally closing down FED. We were in 
meetings [with members of other cooperatives] and people said: ‘These fucking 
FED members, they have closed one company and now they are coming here 
to close another one. [...] Fucking relocated people, why don't they go home? 
[...] And, besides, they come here now to take our jobs? [...] We don't want 
suckers here’. [...] So you have a stigma on your back for being relocated and 
not being like them. (SC Member) 
Interviewed former middle-line technicians and managers have found it easier to get a 
permanent relocation in other cooperatives. They nevertheless share the idea that many 
former FED members, mainly in blue-collar positions, have not been well received in 
many cooperatives. Some managers criticise that other Mondragon cooperatives are 
blaming former FED members and their attitudes as an excuse to not relocate them. 
Low educational profile of former FED partners 
Given its Taylorist production chains, FED employed many low skilled worker-members 
(see Basterretxea et al., 2019). Low education requirements made it easy to relocate other 
cooperatives’ worker-owners in the 1980s and 1990s crises: 
In the 1990s [...] hundreds of relocated people arrived at FED from other 
Mondragon cooperatives on buses, [...] people whose training was not 
evaluated. The last and largest relocation station was FED because it had 
assembly lines, and in the chains any trainee is able to work with a little help 
and skill. (Mondragon Senior Manager) 
The same low training requirements, which made FED a good company to relocate other 
overstaffed cooperative members to in the past, became an impediment to relocation when 
FED was the overstaffed company. According to interviewed FED managers, six years 
after the fall of FED, approximately half of the former members who were still 
temporarily relocated had no vocational training and many had no compulsory secondary 
education. This undermines the foundations of functional flexibility and prevents 
members from aspiring to permanent relocation in many Mondragon cooperatives. 
Many former FED worker-members have been reluctant to take part in vocational training 
courses. This reluctance has been perceived even by interviewed Basque Government 
officials, who offered vocational training programmes to FED members when the 
company went bankrupt: 
We met with FED's SC and [...] what surprised me most was that [...] when we 
mentioned the importance that training has for the success of the relocations, 
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people were reluctant. Although they can be relocated to a job and there may 
be a plan to improve their training, it seems like they don’t want it. [...] Even 
though it is beneficial to both them and the cooperative. […] In addition, we saw 
that there were people with very low qualifications, and a strong relocation effort 
was needed, together with institutions such as Lanbide (Basque Employment 
Service). There was a big problem with this. (Senior Government Official) 
Mondragon’s response 
Mondragon and Lagun Aro do not have executive authority to impose relocations, thus 
relocation policy depends on the goodwill of the cooperatives that have vacancies 
(Arando & Arenaza, 2018). As Table 2 shows, besides relying on goodwill, Lagun Aro 
gives important economic incentives in order to increase permanent relocations. 
According to interviewees, Lagun Aro pays 82,000 euro to its cooperatives for each 
temporary relocated member who is older than 50 and who is offered a permanent 
relocation; the aid amount is 66,000 euro if the member is younger than 50. This is all 
under the condition that, if the activity of the receiving cooperative does not sustain the 
employment of its members, the first to leave may be the last to be relocated, at no 
additional cost. Even so, the already mentioned fear of the loss of flexibility in the 
workforce leads many host cooperatives to reject the agreement. 
In 2013 Mondragon and Udalaitz, with funding from the Basque Government and Lagun 
Aro and through agreements with their training centres, also provided vocational 
retraining for 340 former FED members with permanent relocation difficulties because 
of low or inadequate qualifications (TU Lankide, 2015). Arando & Arenaza (2018) 
expose that this plan was preceded by one to obtain the compulsory secondary education 
diploma. The objective was that these former partners could obtain an official degree in 
mechanics or mechatronics – studying four hours, from Monday to Thursday during a 
three-year period – in order to achieve permanent relocations. Lagun Aro facilitated the 
leave of absence with a single payment protection. In addition, the training hours had an 
impact on unemployment benefit and 50% of these hours were returned once the training 
was completed. During the 2014–2015 academic year, only 52 of the aforementioned 340 
former FED members agreed to enrol in the first course of the educational programme. 
In the 2016–2017 academic year, only 35% of these 340 members took the training, 
among which 41 were already in the third course (Arando & Arenaza, 2018). 
However, according to interviewees, these measures should have been taken before 
FED’s closure. Other cooperatives in the Fagor Group took interim HR management 
measures as early as the 1980s. 
When their training plans are something they establish when there is no other 
solution, they don't work. [...] It had to be done long before FED was in trouble, 
when the problem started to show. [...] Now, if they propose a training plan to 
me from Udalaitz, in my receiving cooperative they will say: [...] ‘You are not my 
partner, [...] I don't give a damn if you study or not, fend for yourself to study, 
do it in your free time. Now, do I have to give you free time? No, not at all’. 
Udalaitz proposes that you stop working and start studying, but you lose your 
job. They help you; they make things easier for you, but it is still a risk to start 
studying. (SC Member) 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper adds evidence, at a corporate analysis level, to the studies that link poor 
implementation of flexicurity policies and increased labour market precariousness 
(Domínguez, 2012; Fernández-Rodríguez et al., 2012; Gialis et al., 2014; Gialis & Taylor, 
2016). In fact, some flexicurity policies applied to face FED’s crisis – temporary 
relocations seven years after the firm’s closure, long-term wage cuts, or functional 
flexibility and relocations of workers without proper multi-skill training – could be 
labelled as flexiprecarity (López et al., 2014). 
FED’s case also shows that the negative effects of flexicurity policies on satisfaction and 
commitment increase when these measures are driven by contextual factors, consistent 
with previous research (Origo & Pagani, 2008). 
As in the past, Mondragon’s flexicurity mechanisms have helped to lessen the 
employment crisis effects generated by FED’s collapse. Nevertheless, the findings of this 
research suggest that the competitive advantages flexicurity gave to Mondragon 
cooperatives have been significantly reduced since the 2008 financial crisis. 
The long-term competitive advantage via lower social costs (Whyte & Whyte, 1988; 
Ormaechea, 1998; Basterretxea & Albizu, 2010) has been diminished. The fees that 
Mondragon cooperatives pay to finance unemployment coverage have grown 
significantly and are, nowadays, close to the fees non-cooperative competitors pay to the 
social security system. The types of benefits have also changed. Almost three quarters of 
the benefits paid in the 2008–2015 period have been devoted to goals that do not offer 
greater labour flexibility: unemployment benefits, early retirement and severance pay for 
voluntary redundancies. 
In the 2008 financial crisis and in the pre- and post-failure of FED, relocations have been 
more difficult because the crisis affected many cooperatives in different industries at the 
same time. Furthermore, a large part of FED’s workforce was difficult to relocate. Many 
older redundant members with low vocational training certifications were offered early 
retirement. Flexible schedules did not offer the same competitive advantage of the past 
either. In fact, a great part of the unemployment benefits paid in the 2007–2018 period 
was paid to cooperative members affected by flexible schedules who were unable to 
recover non-worked hours. Flexible schedules work well and give competitive 
advantages in short crises, when hours not worked can be easily made up in following 
months. In a long crisis, such as the one that affected FED from 2007 to its demise in 
2013, flexible schedules act as a way to delay harder decisions and perpetuate a firm’s 
structural problems.  
Conventional Spanish firms’ labour flexibility, which has increased since the 2012 
Spanish labour market reform (López et al., 2014), also explains why flexicurity policies 
are less important sources of competitive advantage for Mondragon than in former crises. 
These findings also add evidence to the growing body of labour geography, by studying 
how workers can play important active roles in shaping the way labour markets function 
and in refusing worse employment conditions. This is accomplished by analysing the role 
of FED’s three-tier spatially segmented workforce – worker-members in the Basque 




Drawing on Katz’s (2004) disaggregation of agency into acts of resistance, reworking and 
resilience, FED’s wage labourers in international subsidiaries resisted external numerical 
flexibility measures through trade union collective action, work stoppages and strikes. 
The French and Polish unions’ efforts to escalate conflict and develop French–Spanish or 
Polish–Spanish solidarity actions against austerity and downsizing measures failed. The 
study findings show that developing trans-spatial solidarity actions between traditional 
unions and workers’ representatives in cooperatives is unfeasible given the special labour 
agency of worker-members. 
In contrast with previous research on Mondragon flexicurity policies, this research shows 
that, in the specific case of FED and the context related to its fall, there is a strong 
resistance to relocations and functional flexibility. There were many reasons why former 
FED members resisted functional flexibility and relocations before the company’s 
demise: strong sense of belonging to the business unit they had been working for 
historically, fear of uncertainty and change of routines, false sense of security and the 
need to avoid the stigma of being relocated. 
The response of worker-members to austerity measures differed significantly from that 
of wage labourers in foreign subsidiaries, since they were the ones who voted in favour 
of labour flexibility measures in the general assembly and cooperative regulation forbids 
strikes over workplace grievances. Active agency resistance actions took place in the 
various general assemblies where austerity measures decisions were made. The SC also 
actively opposed and slowed down some flexicurity measures, mainly relocations. This 
study also offers evidence of strong passive agency of worker-owners. The collected 
quantitative data and interviewees’ opinions suggest that FED worker-members used 
individualistic ‘scrappy acts of resilience’ (Katz, 2004) to avoid being relocated to other 
cooperatives, such as pretended medical disabilities, sick absence and reduced leave 
schedules. 
The opposition to relocations raises the question whether the nature of cooperatives 
neutralises the moral risk of labour relations (Navarra & Tortia, 2014). Given cooperative 
members’ dual condition of workers and owners, Mondragon’s official discourse often 
transmits that their workplaces are free from labour–capital and management–labour 
conflicts. Some researchers echo this official discourse, even arguing that Mondragon 
eliminates the basic agency dilemma, since principals are agents and agents are principals 
(Mathews, 2003). In sharp contrast with this idyllic view, these findings add evidence to 
other studies that highlight the risk of conflict and ‘free-riding’ (Basterretxea & Storey, 
2018; Basterretxea, et al., 2019; Bonin et al., 1993; Klein, 1987; McCarthy et al., 2010; 
Pendleton & Robinson, 2010). Future research in this field would be necessary to clarify 
the true perception of members without management responsibilities toward their 
relationship with managers and with the cooperative itself. 
Moreover, although this study focuses on flexicurity policies applied mainly to rank and 
file workers, as previous researches did, it also makes a relevant contribution to the 
literature on FED’s failure by mentioning the application of these policies to managers, 
something not previously addressed. Even low performing managers, who were the most 
responsible for FED’s failure, were given priority to be relocated to other cooperatives 
and even promoted to higher positions in Mondragon. This employment security for 
cooperative managers raises questions about its efficacy in dealing with crises as well as 
ethical questions, which open up a new fruitful path of future research. 
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These research findings also highlight another factor largely overlooked by previous 
Mondragon literature: host cooperatives’ barriers to permanently relocate other 
cooperatives’ redundant members. Despite economic incentives to convert temporary 
relocated members into permanent ones, more than 400 former FED members are still 
temporarily relocated more than seven years after the firm’s demise. There are several 
reasons for not offering permanent relocations: (1) fear of a loss of staff flexibility; (2) 
refusal to fill posts belonging to temporary employees of the receiving cooperative with 
relocated FED workers; (3) perception of poor work ethics among some former FED 
members; and (4) the low educational profile of many former FED members. 
A lack of preventive training by FED led to a negligent application of functional 
flexibility, which requires workers capable of occupying many positions (Albizu & 
Basterretxea, 1998; Landeta et al., 2016). As recommended by Fernández-Rodríguez et 
al. (2012), a more preventive focus is proposed for future crises. Each cooperative firm 
must have its own process to systematically identify worker groups at risk of de-
professionalisation. Some Mondragon cooperatives ask for vocational training 
qualifications for all candidates willing to become worker-owners. These training 
requirements facilitate potential future relocations and future retraining programmes. In 
the case of FED, the vocational retraining programmes began in 2014, once the company 
had disappeared and almost ten years after the first massive FED relocations took place 
at the fridges unit. In the early phases of future crises, vocational retraining programmes 
should be promoted. 
Wage flexibility is also considered by interviewees as a proper measure of cooperatives 
to face short time crises. When used for many years, as in FED, it generates many negative 
attitudinal and behavioural outcomes as already found in previous studies (Basterretxea 
& Storey, 2018; Basterretxea et al., 2019). The competitive advantage of cooperatives 
through wage flexibility has decreased in relative terms. After the 2008 financial crisis, 
legislative changes in Spain have also increased wage flexibility of other non-cooperative 
companies. 
It has been found that former FED members positively perceive the job security provided 
by Mondragon. Nevertheless, they feel they have become part of Mondragon’s temporary 
employment agency. Although the partners’ concern about their employability has 
disappeared, the poor conditions related to relocations that the interviewees have exposed 
seem to be a concern of the same calibre. 
Some of this study’s findings also have implications for managers of non-cooperative 
firms adopting flexicurity policies. Sadly, the Covid-19 coronavirus crisis implies that 
some of those policies must be applied on a large scale in the whole economy. Flexible 
schedules have been imposed by force in most Spanish firms during the coronavirus 
lockdowns. All workers in non-essential jobs have been paid recoverable leave from 30th 
March 2020 until 9th April 2020. Those workers will have to gradually make up the hours 
not worked during this period, in a way that is agreed with their employer. Similar 
lockdowns in other European, American and Asian countries will also force the adoption 
of working time flexibility. Following the lessons of FED’s case, flexible working time 
will help to alleviate transitory difficulties in firms operating in industries with fast V-
shaped recovery. Firms with large L-shaped crises probably will not make up not worked 
hours. Similarly, wage flexibility can also be a good short-term policy for firms with rapid 
recoveries, while it can generate long-term negative attitudinal and behavioural responses 
in firms with a long-term crisis. 
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Some conclusions drawn from this paper should be considered within the specific case of 
FED’s culture circa its fall; it was never intended for them to be extrapolated to the rest 
of the Mondragon cooperatives. While Taylorist production systems and low education 
requirements to become blue-collar worker-members in FED have made functional 
flexibility and relocations difficult, it is necessary to underline that most Mondragon 
industrial cooperatives have been adopting much more flexible forms of working, such 
as mini-factories, with higher educational and multi-skill requirements. Many other firms 
will also have to adapt their products to new market demands, and as in the case of 
Mondragon cooperatives, those with already high functional flexibility and a multi-
skilled workforce will find it much easier. 
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